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Chapter 5 
Anglo-French Security Cooperation in 
Africa since Saint-Malo
Tony Chafer
Given the burgeoning literature both on the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) and on Africa’s security challenges (see for example Howorth 
2007, Franke 2009), it is surprising that there has been no attempt to explore 
in detail Anglo-French security collaboration in Africa. This chapter begins by 
showing the lack of any meaningful UK-French cooperation from the colonial 
era to the immediate post Cold War period. It then demonstrates how, in the wake 
of the 1998 Saint-Malo summit, collaboration has begun to take place in terms 
of the institutionalisation of the security relationship, peacekeeping missions 
and military training activities in Africa. Finally, recent developments in Anglo-
French security relations are explained by reference to neoclassical realism. This 
theory usefully goes beyond neorealism’s focus on recurrent patterns of inter-
state interactions in the international system by introducing as variables in the 
making of foreign policy both policy-makers’ perceptions of the state’s relative 
material power and the degree of state autonomy.
Before proceeding, it should be emphasised that this chapter does not cover the 
security challenges of Africa in general or indeed explore the outcomes (or lack 
thereof) of Anglo-French security collaboration. Second, cooperation between the 
French and British defence industries is not the subject of this analysis, although 
joint procurement and moves to integrate Europe’s defence industries are now 
realities that cannot be ignored (UK–France Summit 2010). Third, it does not 
attempt to cover intelligence sharing due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable 
data – although there are indications that the UK and France enjoy a semi-hostile 
relationship in this area. Under the ‘3Is’ arrangement information and intelligence 
are shared only with Canada and the US, while ‘5Is’ extends this arrangement to 
Australia and New Zealand. In each case France is excluded. Fourth, lack of space 
precludes treatment of the civilian dimension of security cooperation, such as police 
and security sector reform (SSR). As Chapter 9 of this volume demonstrates, there 
is some evidence of limited Anglo-French cooperation – or at least of avoidance 
of duplication of effort – in this field in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), where the UK has given funding and the French have provided ‘boots 
on the ground’ and where there have also been attempts to fuse missions such as 
EUPOL (police) and EUSEC (security sector). In Guinea-Bissau, too, there has 
been some coordination of effort on SSR. It should, however, also be noted that 
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there is some ambiguity regarding the civilian and military dimensions of SSR. 
This ambiguity can be discerned in the different perspectives that traditionally 
mark the thinking of the European Commission (‘soft’ civilian SSR) and that of 
the European Council (a ‘harder’ military/security perspective). In this chapter the 
emphasis will be on the latter. 
History of Rivalry
Anglo-French military rivalry was a feature of the colonial period in Africa. The 
late 19th-century scramble for Africa frequently pitted the French against the 
British, and this rivalry came to a head, bringing the two countries to the brink 
of war when the forces of Britain’s Lord Kitchener squared up against those of 
France’s Captain Marchand at Fashoda in 1898. Marchand ultimately was ordered 
to withdraw, and as a result the term ‘Fashoda syndrome’ entered the French 
language and became short-hand for Anglo-French rivalry, and more specifically 
British perfidy, in Africa. Such rivalry was attenuated by the Entente Cordiale 
in 1904, by cooperation during the First World War against Germany’s colonies 
in Africa and by the ill-fated Anglo-French Suez expedition in 1956. But for a 
century after Fashoda, Anglo-French relations south of the Sahara were essentially 
characterised by competition rather than cooperation.
This rivalry continued during the Cold War and early post-colonial period. 
France adopted a ‘voluntarist’, unilateral military approach with pre-positioned 
forces in former colonies, advisers working closely with African governments, 
and military personnel embedded with African forces under the terms of French 
defence and military cooperation agreements with African states. The UK, in 
contrast, had no bases and undertook virtually no interventions (except Kenya 
1963–4), although it did have British Military Advisory and Training Teams 
(BMATTs) working with the armed forces in ex-colonies. Furthermore, military 
academies in the UK, like their counterparts in France, took African soldiers from 
the former empire for training. All of this took place in a spirit of competition, 
occasionally even hostility, with Britain and France actually finding themselves 
on opposite sides over the Nigerian civil war in Biafra (1967–70). Indeed, these 
differences of approach were not confined to Africa, but reflected a wider lack 
of security cooperation at a European level and within NATO, particularly after 
France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966.
This lack of cooperation continued into the early post-Cold War era (1990–
97). In this new context, Britain and France initially seemed quite prepared for 
multilateral militaro-humanitarian interventions, as the issue of sovereignty 
became less predominant, but events in Somalia in 1992 discouraged most 
Europeans as well as the US from undertaking such interventions. This 
reluctance was most clearly seen at the time of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda 
when the UK and US led the international community in its refusal to intervene 
and, subsequently, used the UN Security Council (UNSC) to limit the scope of 
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France’s Operation Turquoise, which was launched when the killing in Rwanda 
had largely stopped in June 1994 (Fenton 2004: 140). A similar scenario occurred 
in late 1996 when Britain and the US were instrumental in blocking French efforts 
to raise a multinational force to intervene in Zaire (now the DRC).
Throughout this entire period, Anglo-French divergences on security questions 
were compounded by the absence of a meaningful institutional framework in 
which Britain and France could work at a bilateral or bi-multi level. Franco-
British summits provided a forum for wide-ranging discussions but did not focus 
specifically or even primarily on security issues. NATO was of limited use, even 
though from 1995 French President Jacques Chirac did begin to make overtures 
towards it. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) also failed to offer a forum 
within which security cooperation could be taken forward. The UNSC did provide 
a mechanism but could just as easily be used to block as to advance proposals, 
as the aforementioned examples of Rwanda and Zaire have illustrated. The same 
is true of the EU where the UK hampered France’s attempts to link up with the 
Germans within the purview of the Western European Union and through the 
creation of the Eurocorps in 1995 (Loisel 2004: 44).
Saint-Malo: A New Departure
The pivotal moment which brought about a shift towards greater cooperation 
was the 1998 Saint-Malo summit. The Saint-Malo I declaration is mainly noted 
for its role in laying the foundation stone of the ESDP (Howorth 2004: 4). In 
particular, it stated that the European Council ‘must be able to take decisions 
on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in 
Title V of the Treaty of European Union’ and that ‘the Union must have the 
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces … in order 
to respond to international crises’ (Howorth 2004: 4, 34, my emphasis). The word 
‘autonomous’ marked a crucial breakthrough, as it made it possible for the first 
time for the EU to intervene militarily outside the framework of NATO. This was 
a key French foreign policy priority. Saint-Malo II actually made no mention of 
security cooperation but simply committed the two governments to ‘harmonise 
policies towards Africa and pursue close cooperation on the ground; promote the 
EU common position on human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and 
good governance in Africa; [and] contribute to the stability of the continent’ by 
focusing on debt issues and development assistance. The intention to cooperate 
in the defence field was only made explicit at the Cahors Franco-British summit 
in February 2001.1 
The Saint-Malo summit also served as the catalyst for efforts to create a 
more meaningful institutional framework within which the French and British, 
often alongside other Northern states, could engage in bilateral or ‘bi-multi’ 
1 Document obtained from the FCO, 2 April 2001.
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cooperation. Since Saint-Malo, the French and British have developed more 
specifically bilateral links. Thus, the Franco-British summits now always include 
a section on Africa and the presence of both defence ministers at the 2001 Cahors 
summit symbolised the new spirit of cooperation in security matters. There 
have been joint statements by UK and French defence ministers and joint visits 
by foreign ministers Miliband and Kouchner to crisis-ridden countries such as 
the DRC in November 2008. Crucially too, institutional bridges have been built 
through Anglo-French secondments of personnel that are designed to improve the 
two countries’ mutual understanding of each other’s modus operandi in the peace 
and security field. Thus, the French and British ministries of defence exchanged 
chargés de mission from 2005–08, stationed reciprocally in the central policy-
making departments of each ministry. The French attach considerable importance 
to these exchanges. However, the British abolished the post in 2008, which left 
one French official in London with no British counterpart in Paris. The UK also 
sends a British officer to Paris as deputy director of EURORECAMP (discussed 
later). In addition, a French officer is embedded with British forces in Nairobi and 
a British officer was seconded to French forces in Dakar until 2009, when British 
government cutbacks put an end to the arrangement.
Significantly too, Saint-Malo was the trigger for the creation of a number of 
fora in which cooperation and dialogue were possible at EU level, such as the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Military Committee. Anglo-
French cooperation within the PSC has been a sine qua non for the approval of 
the ESDP missions (discussed below) and for a range of other initiatives on which 
joint actions or statements have been agreed, such as on Darfur and Chad for 
example (New York Times 2007, 20 July).
Another significant attempt by Britain and France to develop closer ties 
between themselves and with the United States in the security field has been 
the P3 initiative at the UNSC. While this informal mechanism for consultation 
between three of the five permanent Security Council members was announced 
in late 1997, it was not until after Saint-Malo that the P3 became effective as a 
forum for harmonizing British, French and American policies on peacekeeping, 
capacity-building and other security challenges in Africa and beyond. With around 
70 per cent of the UNSC’s business relating to Africa in recent years, the P3 has 
been an important arena for Anglo-French security cooperation, particularly when 
the French and British ambassadors to the UN in New York have enjoyed a good 
personal relationship and even more so when relations between the UK and US 
Ambassadors have been strained, as they were between Sir Emyr Jones Parry 
and John Bolton (personal communications, former UK officials, New York and 
London, 2008). 
During the Bush presidency, the P3 initiative would sometimes involve Anglo-
French talks to coordinate their positions as a prelude to trying to get the US 
on board; for example, the Qatar initiative to get the Darfur rebels to join peace 
talks with the Sudanese government was initiated by the French with support from 
the UK and subsequently the US came on board. The Anglo-French initiative, 
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launched in late 2008, to improve UN peacekeeping mandates is also a good 
example of bi-multi cooperation, with the US now increasingly involved in the 
discussions along with the other P5 members.2 
It should of course be noted that the P3 and EU are multilateral mechanisms, 
and the UK and France do not always share the same analysis within these 
fora. London and Paris therefore need wider support in these arenas in order to 
take certain initiatives forward. This is not always forthcoming, particularly in 
instances where the UK or France is deemed to be instrumentalising the UNSC or 
ESDP to serve their national interests. Britain’s stance on the 2003 Iraq War and 
France’s promotion of the EUFOR Chad mission might be cited in this context. 
Nevertheless, the fact that both the UK and France are permanent members of the 
UNSC, key players in Europe and major actors in the peace and security arena in 
Africa does offer unrivalled scope for working together in areas of mutual interest 
before bringing others on board (personal communications, former UK officials, 
London and New York, 2008–09).
The UK, France and the ESDP in Africa
There have been two main forms of Anglo-French security cooperation since Saint-
Malo, namely peacekeeping missions and training African peacekeepers. We shall 
begin by focusing on the former, specifically ESDP military missions, of which 
there have been four in Africa: Operation Artemis, DRC, June–September 2003; 
EUFOR DRC, July–November 2006; EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic 
(CAR), January 2008–March 2009; and EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, 
December 2008–ongoing.3
Peacekeeping Missions in Africa
Artemis was the first ‘autonomous’ EU military operation (that is, conducted 
without recourse to NATO assets) and the first ESDP operation outside Europe. 
France was the ‘framework nation’ for the operation and provided the operational 
headquarters and the majority – 90 per cent – of the 1,400-strong force on the 
ground, although the UK sent a special operations unit, which played a crucial 
role in resurfacing the runway at Bunia, as all supplies had to be flown in. 
The UK also provided invaluable support by persuading a reluctant Ugandan 
government to offer airport facilities at Entebbe (Bagayoko 2004: 103). The 
2 This initiative now extends to the C34 Special Committee on peacekeeping, which 
includes around 120 members; communications with British officials, New York, 2009.
3 There have also been other civilian/military missions in Africa: EUSSR Guinea-
Bissau, 12 February 2008–31 May 2009; EUPOL DRC, 1 July 2007–30 June 2009); and 
EUSEC DRC, 8 June 2005–30 September 2010. These operations will not concern us, as 
this chapter focuses on military missions.
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operation was limited in time (four months) and had a mandate to protect civilian 
life and stabilise the humanitarian situation in Bunia (eastern DRC) following 
the withdrawal of Ugandan forces and the inability of the UN force, MONUC, to 
prevent renewed violence. In the aftermath of European divisions over the Anglo-
American invasion of Iraq, ‘France badly wanted a mission to show the EU was 
capable of acting alone, where NATO would not be involved’ (Gegout 2005: 437). 
While London’s go-ahead was mainly to prove that the UK was still interested in 
developing a European defence capability (personal communication, former UK 
official, New York, 2008). In this case Anglo-French cooperation was clearly the 
product of convergent agendas that were themselves the result, in the British case 
at least, of changing domestic policy preferences. This textbook operation was 
widely acclaimed and demonstrated that the EU could undertake a peacekeeping 
mission far from Europe’s borders (Helly 2009: 183–5).
Like Artemis, EUFOR DRC was a time-limited and targeted operation. Its 
mission was to support the UN force, MONUC, in supervising the 2006 election 
process in DRC. Germany provided the operational HQ; the largest troop 
contributors were France and Germany; and the largest bilateral contributor to 
the elections (£35m) was the UK, although it sent no combat troops. Here, in 
order to appreciate how France, without any offer of manpower from the UK, was 
able to ensure the launch of such an operation, we need to look more closely at 
the wider European context. Needless to say, France, and for that matter Belgium, 
had a strong national interest in using the EU ‘as an instrument to take care of 
their concerns for the DRC’s stability’ (Olsen 2009: 18). Paris also brought other 
states, notably a reluctant Germany, on board, despite German anxiety about 
potential troop losses, thanks to the prevailing political situation in Europe. There 
was, in particular, a perceived need to reassert the credibility of the EU following 
the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by Ireland, France and the Netherlands. 
In effect, EUFOR DRC was ‘more about European form than African substance’, 
with the ‘actual reality on the ground in Congo [constituting] only a secondary 
factor’ (International Herald Tribune, 13 June 2006). The EUFOR operation also 
needs to be understood against the backdrop of the adoption of the EU Strategy 
for Africa in 2005: the mission was seen by the operation’s French commander, 
Major-General Damay, as a test case for the strategy and a ‘laboratory’ for the 
ESDP (quoted in The EU’s Africa Strategy 2007: 5). More generally, there was 
a consensus between member states and the European Commission (EC) that 
the EU should contribute to conflict prevention and peacekeeping in the DRC, 
and EUFOR DRC also provided the opportunity ‘to get some good coverage 
for the EU’ (Howorth 2007: 239). For the UK, the stability of the DRC was 
of paramount concern: it was a significant contributor to SSR and, through the 
work of the Department for International Development (DfID), was one of the 
country’s largest donors.4 French and British agendas in the DRC thus converged, 
4 In 2007, the UK was the third largest bilateral donor providing 121.3 M€, behind 
Belgium (153.1 M€) and the US (132.4 M€) but well ahead of France (52.1 M€), OECD 
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with Britain keen to ensure the success of the elections and France concerned to 
stabilise the country and to demonstrate once again the EU’s capacity for military 
action. 
EUFOR Chad/CAR was authorised by UNSC Resolution 1778. Described as 
‘a multi-dimensional mission to help create the security conditions necessary for 
reconstruction’ in Chad and the CAR, it was mandated to ‘protect civilians, facilitate 
delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure the safety of UN personnel’. Its scope was 
thus very limited, as it had no mandate to address the underlying political problem 
in Chad, which is the refusal of President Deby even to talk to the opposition. 
Indeed, EUSR officials were specifically instructed not to talk to the Chadian rebels 
(personal communication, EU official, Addis Ababa, 2009). France was the largest 
contributor to the operation (2,500 out of 3,700 troops) and the operational HQ 
was in Paris, although the force commander was an Irish lieutenant-general, Pat 
Nash. Like its forerunners, it was a time-limited operation and was presented as a 
bridging mission that would stabilise the humanitarian situation while a UN force 
was put together. EUFOR Chad/CAR handed over to a UN force, MINURCAT II, 
in March 2009.
France’s support for this mission was based primarily on its concern for 
the stability of two of its key allies in central Africa, Chad and CAR (personal 
communication, French official, Addis Ababa, 2009). It also saw the operation as a 
way of further demonstrating the autonomous military capability of the EU (Olsen 
2009: 18) and of involving other European powers more fully in burden-sharing 
in the region. For the UK, however, the focus was more narrowly on Darfur and 
on the danger that events there could spark a truly regional crisis. The Foreign 
Office (FCO) began planning for this eventuality ahead of any mission and, with 
help from the British High Commission in Cameroon, it developed Whitehall’s 
understanding of the Chad/Sudan situation and held a joint meeting with France 
on both countries. Yet Britain’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) remained cautious, 
refusing to participate in the mission and initially blocking funding for it. It was 
only after a high-level exchange between President Sarkozy and Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown that the UK sent two staff officers to operational HQ in Paris and 
two to the field HQ in Chad, as well as later unblocking the money and even 
co-sponsoring the UN resolution that authorised the EU deployment (personal 
communication, UK official, London, 2009). This latter decision was no doubt 
prompted by the fact that the British public and the US administration were so 
exercised over the situation in Sudan/Darfur, that the killings in Darfur were being 
so widely reported in the UK media and that British NGOs were pressing for 
‘humanitarian intervention’. 
The above account does not, however, explain how the two countries succeeded 
in getting the agreement of other member states to the ESDP mission; Germany, 
in particular, suspected France of using the international community to shore 
up its own African sphere of influence, or chasse gardee, a concern also shared 
2009: 122.
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by the UK. In the end, EU support was forthcoming, primarily because both the 
UK and France supported the mission and thanks also to widely shared concerns 
about the refugee crisis and the possibility that genocide might be occurring in 
Darfur, which gave rise to a diffuse sense that the EU needed to be seen to be 
‘doing something’. From the limited perspective of Anglo-French cooperation 
the authorisation of EUFOR Chad/CAR was a success.
Finally, Operation Atalanta broke new ground for the EU as it was the first 
ESDP naval operation. The UN passed a declaration, co-sponsored by France 
and the US, which authorised nations to enter Somali territorial waters with 
the agreement of the transitional Somali government. This opened the door to 
Operation Atalanta, the objective of which is to ‘contribute to the deterrence, 
prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali 
coast’. With stakeholders including the UN, NATO and nine other countries, 
Atalanta involves 1,200 personnel and 16 ships, not all from EU member states 
(Gya and Herz 2009: 2). Crucially, it is the first ESDP mission to be led by the UK.
While there was widespread concern among EU member states about piracy off 
the Somali coast, this alone does not explain the EU’s involvement or the specific 
configuration of the operation. From the French perspective, Atalanta offered 
another opportunity, in a new arena, to demonstrate the military capability of the 
EU. However, although France was instrumental in securing UNSC authorisation, 
it had played a key role in each of the three other ESDP missions in Africa and was 
keen – for political reasons and also due to cuts in its defence budget – not to take 
the lead on this occasion. This coincided with concerns within the UK permanent 
delegation in Brussels that Britain, having participated in just one ESDP military 
mission, might be criticised for showing insufficient commitment to ESDP or 
to peacekeeping in Africa. Despite initial reluctance from the FCO and MoD in 
London, the naval chief of staff was keen for the UK to be involved and France 
was happy for Britain to take the lead. Northwood thus emerged as the command 
HQ for the operation (personal communications, UK and French officials, 
Brussels; former UK naval officer, 2009). Again this appears to be a successful 
example of Anglo-French cooperation. But it would be wrong to explain the UK’s 
involvement primarily in terms of support for ESDP; it was, rather, a response to 
lobbying by private sector actors keen to maintain London’s status as the city that 
hosts the International Maritime Organisation and a major international hub for 
commercial shipping.
So what conclusions can we draw from these missions? The willingness to 
deploy European troops in peacekeeping and conflict management operations is a 
new feature of EU African policy since Saint-Malo. This willingness derives from 
the fact that the European Council, rather than the EC, is increasingly playing the 
lead role in EU African policy, as it is the Council that has been tasked with the 
planning, launching and conduct of ESDP missions. Within this intergovernmental 
context, France in particular has played a key role in pressing for EU military 
interventions. It has been successful thanks largely to British support, or at least 
acquiescence, within the European Council. There is a sense in London, Paris 
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and Brussels that, when Britain and France agree, initiatives make progress. 
There are clearly synergies between the French and British positions, and from 
the UK perspective it is in Africa that there is most to be gained from these 
synergies. Nevertheless, cooperation remains far from automatic, and it is worth 
remembering that the UK intervention in Sierra Leone and French operations in 
Côte d’Ivoire were both largely unilateral, despite coming after Saint-Malo and 
being only partly driven by interests.5
Training Peacekeepers
Apart from cooperation to launch ESDP operations, the UK and France have been 
involved in training African peacekeepers. There are two closely linked aspects 
to this training: actions taken under RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités 
Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) and related initiatives, and support for the 
peacekeeping efforts of African sub-regional organisations and of the African 
Union (AU). The focus here will be on the first of these aspects, as support for 
AU’s peacekeeping efforts is covered in Chapter 10, although brief mention will 
also be made of the backup given to African sub-regional organisations.
By the mid-1990s, African states were increasingly sceptical about French 
military interventions and Northern governments were – following their 
experiences in Somalia, Rwanda and Liberia – ever more reluctant to intervene 
directly in Africa. Against this backdrop, France, Britain and, indeed, the US, all 
came to recognise the importance of Africans taking greater responsibility for 
peacekeeping on the continent. They also acknowledged that African forces could 
not be expected to contain instability on their own. Initially, they launched separate 
programmes: RECAMP (France), the UK’s African Peacekeeping Training 
Support Programme and ACRI (US: African Crisis Response Initiative). However, 
the three countries quickly realised the need to coordinate their programmes and in 
late 1997 announced the ‘P3 initiative’ (discussed above), in an effort to harmonise 
their capacity-building programmes in Africa and also to get other actors involved 
(Franke 2009: 78). Subsequently, in 2001, the UK’s training programme was 
subsumed into a much larger initiative, the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP), which 
included one fund specifically for Africa and another for conflicts arising elsewhere 
in the world. Under both the Africa and the Global CPP programmes, the FCO, 
DfID and MoD pooled their budgets for promoting conflict prevention and peace, 
with the Cabinet Office providing coordination at ministerial level. This was an 
example of ‘joined-up thinking’ by Tony Blair’s New Labour Administration.
The Africa CPP’s priorities were laid out in a jointly agreed UK sub-Saharan 
Africa Strategy for Conflict Prevention, with activities being programmed and 
agreed annually. Its budget for 2005–06 was £60m. This was a modest sum in the 
5 France nonetheless offered diplomatic support to the UK intervention in Sierra 
Leone. The UK also backed France’s request for UN peacekeepers in Côte d’Ivoire and 
financed a Ghanaian contingent subsequently deployed under UN auspices, Loisel 2004: 52.
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context of overall DfID spending, but the Pool was principally seen as a ‘catalyst 
to ensure coherence and effectiveness of UK intervention’ (ACPP 2004). However, 
while the programme reflected much greater commitment to training and military 
exercises than was evident under the previous Conservative administration, the 
Pool has essentially functioned as a bilateral mechanism providing peace support 
in selected priority countries, such as Sierra Leone, and no formal mechanisms 
have been created for cooperation with other powers in the area of conflict 
management.
As for RECAMP, this represented a greater refocusing of France’s security 
policy, away from its traditional unilateral approach towards a more multilateral 
approach designed to develop the capability of African armed forces to conduct 
their own peacekeeping operations. RECAMP sought to contribute to this 
objective in three ways: through support for military training schools involved 
in peacekeeping training for African soldiers; through peacekeeping training 
for African units in sub-regional training exercises; and through equipment and 
logistical support for units engaged in peacekeeping.
With respect to the training of African peacekeepers, the UK and France took 
steps, in the context of RECAMP and in conjunction with the US, to coordinate 
their provision in West Africa by establishing a regional network of training 
centres that would complement each other and reduce duplication. Thus, the focus 
of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, which 
was initially UK-funded, is on operational level training; the Ecole de Maintien 
de la Paix in Bamako undertakes tactical-level training (the UK is represented on 
the School board) and receives support from the EU and several member states, 
as well as from the US, Canada and a number of other donors; and the National 
Defence College in Abuja undertakes strategic-level training. 
The work of these centres is complemented by the efforts of a network of 
regional military training schools, established by the French in 1997 to provide 
training that meets ‘the needs of African army officers [and is] equal in quality 
to that provided in France while being adapted to local realities and resources’ 
(Les Ecoles Nationales à Vocation Régionale n.d.). There are 15 such schools 
in eight francophone African countries. Some have been designated ECOWAS 
(Economic Community of West African States) centres of excellence and so now 
are eligible for EU funding. Like the three schools mentioned above, they are run 
by the hosting nations and recruit, in principle, throughout the region. However, 
as all are situated in Francophone Africa and French is normally the language 
of instruction and their recruitment comes largely from francophone countries. 
This francophone bias has led critics to argue that RECAMP actually deepened 
‘the Francophone-Anglophone divide that is endemic in West Africa’ and even 
undermined the sub-region’s security efforts (Kabia 2008: 185). 
These criticisms are less easily levelled against RECAMP’s successor, 
EURORECAMP. This latter initiative emerged in the wake of the December 2007 
EU Summit in Lisbon during which agreement was reached on the Africa-EU 
Strategic Partnership, one of the four key aims of which was ‘to strengthen and 
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promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights … and regional 
and continental integration in Africa’ (The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership 
2007: 2). It was in this post-Lisbon context that France and the UK took the lead 
in transforming RECAMP, which was originally a national initiative, into an EU 
programme, EURORECAMP. Based in Paris, as France is the ‘framework nation’ 
designated by the EU, EURORECAMP has a French general as its director and a 
British officer as its deputy director. Like RECAMP, it aims to strengthen African 
peacekeeping capacity through education and training. Unlike its predecessor, 
however, it is ‘guided by the principle of African ownership’, and its focus is 
much more explicitly on the AU and Africa’s regional organisations to enable 
them to contribute more effectively to regional security (The Africa-EU Strategic 
Partnership 2007: 5). A good example of this new focus by EURORECAMP is the 
2008 launch of its first training cycle, Amani Africa, (‘Amani’ means ‘peace’ in 
Swahili), which is discussed in Chapter 10.
The UK and France have also been keen to bolster the peacekeeping capacity 
of African regional organisations, such as ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development in East Africa (IGAD). As mentioned above, the 
French and British first began to collaborate on African regional military exercises 
within the framework of RECAMP. For example the UK contributed equipment to 
the RECAMP exercise Tanzanite in 2001 and France took part in the UK-led map 
exercise, Blue Pelican, at the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat in November 2000. 
Subsequently, between 2002 and 2006, the UK, alongside some other EU member 
states, provided ad hoc support to RECAMP military exercises. This was mainly 
in the form of logistical support, but was not on a large scale, was not linked to 
any institutional partnership and was largely symbolic. The UK nonetheless did 
provide more substantial support to a Franco-ECOWAS military training exercise 
in December 2007, which was funded 50 per cent by the French and 25 per cent by 
Britain (personal communication, UK official, Abuja, 2009). However, since 2009 
a combination of budgetary constraints and a FCO strategic review of priorities 
have led to cuts in spending on peace and security in Africa, including a reduction 
in support for ECOWAS – for example, the UK has withdrawn support for the 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra.
The UK and France have undoubtedly helped ECOWAS to develop its 
peacekeeping capability. The two countries have often collaborated particularly 
effectively at the operational level, when it is a question of immediate problem-
solving on the ground such as ensuring that a training exercise is able to go ahead. 
However, Anglo-French cooperation has been far from systematic at the political 
or strategic level. A case in point is their different approaches to the East African 
brigade (EASBRIG) of the ASF. The UK initially took the lead in supporting 
EASBRIG but, in so doing, ran into problems with the French, who have generally 
been reluctant to acknowledge UK leadership. In 2007, for instance, France 
provided a secure LAN for EASBRIG without discussing it with the UK. Such 
problems arise because, once again, there is no formal mechanism for deciding 
what the two countries can or should do together.
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Finally, French and British interest in providing support to Africa-wide 
peacekeeping efforts was heightened when, in 2002, the AU replaced the OAU and 
moved away from a stance based on absolute respect for national sovereignty, to 
one which took greater account of the responsibility to protect (Mwanasali 2009: 
42–4). The UK, France and other EU member states backed AU efforts to develop 
a framework for crisis management on the African continent, namely the African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) although this backing was limited to 
conflict prevention work and not well targeted prior to the adoption of the EU 
Strategy for Africa in 2005 and its successor, the joint Africa-EU Strategy, in 2007. 
One of the key objectives of this joint strategy is to strengthen African capacities, 
not least in the security field (Assessment Report 2009) and it was with this 
objective in view that the Amani Africa training cycle was launched, in November 
2008 (see Chapter 10 for fuller treatment of Anglo-French cooperation in support 
of APSA and Amani Africa). The UK is the largest financial contributor to Amani 
Africa while France takes the lead role in agenda-setting and implementation as 
the framework nation for the EURORECAMP programme (Elowson 2009: 62–3). 
In practice, however, both continue to provide a significant proportion of their 
support for the APSA on a bilateral basis. French and, to some extent, British 
reluctance to give up or share sovereignty over African policy or to lose autonomy 
over spheres of influence and a more general lack of willingness on the part of EU 
member states to pass on information about what they are doing bilaterally with 
the AU remain significant obstacles to more effective cooperation in the security 
field. Overcoming these obstacles is again often down to individual personalities.
Neoclassical Realism, Policy Drivers and Constraints
As indicated earlier, neoclassical realism focuses on interests, preferences and 
power, as well as incorporating domestic political variables within foreign policy 
analysis. In other words, the systemic structure is not determinative, and states, 
through policy processes, do have some capacity for choice. Nonetheless, the key 
point to stress is that neoclassical realism builds on the neo-realist assumption 
that both the UK and France are ultimately driven by concern over their relative 
power within the international system. Within this analytical framework, how then 
are we to account for this significant yet ultimately limited Anglo-French security 
cooperation? In order to answer this question we will examine first the drivers 
towards cooperation, then the constraints on enhanced cooperation.
A key factor, under the reformist government of Lionel Jospin, was France’s 
wish to shed its reputation as the ‘gendarme of Africa’. After the debacle of its 
involvement in Rwanda and former Zaire in the mid-1990s, France was keen both 
to restore its image in Africa and to draw down discreetly from its costly African 
bases. Both these objectives pointed to the need for a more multilateral approach. 
Thus, French military policy in Africa sought to shift the risk of intervention by 
obtaining prior UN or EU approval and through burden-sharing with its allies, 
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notably in ESDP and other peacekeeping operations. Finally, on the security 
front, France was becoming disillusioned with the UN’s peacekeeping efforts and 
looking to the EU – and indeed NATO – to play a greater role (Utley 2006: 65–7).
On the UK side, the drivers were quite different. The New Labour government 
of Tony Blair was beginning its move towards a policy of re-engagement with 
Africa. However, given the regional, and often continent-wide, nature of the 
security challenges facing Africa, the UK could not effectively re-engage without 
having a relationship with Francophone Africa, and this indicated a need to 
cooperate with France. Secondly, the creation of DfID, much of the work of which 
is focused on Africa, helped to keep Africa centre-stage in policy terms, notably 
within the Cabinet, in a way that had not previously been the case. Finally and 
crucially, Prime Minister Blair needed to deliver on his promise to ‘put the UK 
at the heart of Europe’. Following Britain’s failure to join the euro, cooperation 
on African policy – particularly in the security field – provided an arena in which 
the UK could play a central role within the EU (Porteous 2008: 5–15). That this 
was a propitious domain for cooperation had already been demonstrated by the 
understanding that developed between the two armed forces during the crisis in 
Bosnia (personal communication, former British naval officer, Portsmouth 2008).
Thus the Saint-Malo process was launched at a key moment, when both the 
UK and France were anxious about their continuing status as permanent members 
of the UNSC and about their relative loss of influence, the former particularly in 
Africa and the latter in Europe. As a result, the two countries had complementary 
interests pushing them towards closer and mutually beneficial cooperation. Clearly 
by working together in the security domain, these two middle-ranking powers, 
with similar defence expenditures, could increase their influence over European 
security, a fact of no small significance at a time of heightened British fears and 
nascent French concerns about US abandonment. By coordinating their positions, 
the UK and France could generally sway the PCS and other military committees 
in the EU as well as have an impact at the global level, notably within the P3.6 By 
collaborating, they could help to keep the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership on track 
and ensure that European Development Fund monies continue to be earmarked to 
support European peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. By working together, they 
could also – importantly in an age of rapid international media coverage – better 
respond to the often trans-sovereign security-related threats arising from Africa, 
be they from illegal immigration, the spread of AIDS, drugs trafficking, money 
laundering, international criminal activity or indeed the risk of genocide in fragile 
states such as the DRC and Sudan.
By the early 2000s, other factors and events were also pushing the UK and 
France to collaborate. The first of these was the al-Qa’ida attacks of 11 September 
2001, which gave a boost to the idea of security and defence cooperation and 
6 The UK and France are expected under Article 19 of the Amsterdam Treaty to 
brief the other member states on UNSC proceedings and to represent the positions of the 
EU at the Council.
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contributed to the growing emphasis that has been placed on security in EU African 
policy since 2001. The second was the emergence of seemingly intractable crises 
in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. As the former colonial powers, 
the UK and France had to deal with these crises and needed the other’s political 
support so as, at the very least, to avoid tripping each other up. The third catalyst was 
the Iraq War, which initially led to deep divisions within Europe and at the UNSC, 
where the UK and France competed aggressively for the votes of African Security 
Council members (Angola, Cameroon, Guinea) in relation to the proposed second 
UN Resolution. In the end, however, the invasion of Iraq actually encouraged the 
UK and France to look for areas for cooperation in other parts of the world, not 
least Africa (personal communications, former UK officials at the UN, New York, 
2008; see also Loisel 2004: 55). Indeed, the Franco-British summit declaration of 
November 2003 laid considerable emphasis on the two governments’ commitment 
to cooperation in Africa and ‘to the continued development of the EU’s capacity to 
take decisions and act in crisis management’ (Franco-British Summit Declaration 
2003). A final factor has been the emergence of new partners that are playing an 
ever greater role in Africa (China, India, Japan and the Middle East countries). The 
UK and France have, in recent years, become an increasingly less significant part 
of Africa’s foreign relations, with the result that their power to do things in Africa 
and their leverage over African leaders have declined. This has put further pressure 
on British and French governments to pool their efforts in order to maintain their 
relative influence.7 
However, given these pressures to cooperate and the benefits that both 
countries derive from enhanced collaboration, it is perhaps surprising that Anglo-
French cooperation has not been taken further. The explanation would appear to 
lie in the fact that French and British leaders have had to take account of other 
variables, not least their perceived divergent national interests, the capacity of 
their states to act and the views of the wider domestic polity on state preferences. 
On the first of these variables, it is important to underline that Paris and London 
attach different relative importance to Africa and this, in turn, affects both their 
readiness to collaborate on African policy and the areas (often outside the former 
French and British empires) in which they seek to cooperate. For France, Africa 
plays a crucial role in enhancing its rank in the international pecking order, while 
for the UK Africa is much more centrally a development issue. There is also a 
key difference between them over NATO. While neither country would deny 
the existence of a ‘spatial differentiation’ between ESDP and NATO missions, 
whereby Europe operates in sub-Saharan Africa whilst NATO is active in more 
geo-strategically important zones (Dyson 2008), the fact remains that France 
sees cooperation ultimately as a way of affirming an autonomous European 
7 However, French concerns about Chinese economic penetration apparently 
outweigh those of the UK, which in 2009 provided $250,000 to support the China-Africa 
Business Council, www.crid.asso.fr/spip.php?breve58 and www.number10.gov.uk/
Page18214 (accessed 18 March 2010).
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security identity (beyond even ‘Berlin Plus’), whereas the UK sees the ESDP as 
complementary to NATO. 
Furthermore, neo-classical realists would argue that the level of cooperation 
depends ultimately on the ‘extractive capacity’ of the two states. In France, the 
state’s capacity has been limited by its membership of the European Monetary 
Union and by internal spending cuts. The UK government has also faced budgetary 
restrictions, particularly in the 2008–09 global financial crisis. Moreover, its 
long-term commitment to SSR is in doubt: in August 2008, the UK’s two conflict 
prevention pools were combined, and, in March 2009, the conflict prevention 
budget, which had never allocated more than £65m per year to Africa, was 
merged with the Stabilisation Aid Fund and the peacekeeping budget (which pays 
for the UK’s peacekeeping responsibilities at the UN). In the process, the overall 
amount of funding for these activities was cut and the budget for Africa reduced to 
£43 million (Hansard 2009: 25 March). Significantly too, parliamentary and civil 
society constraints mean that the British government has more difficulty getting 
military missions approved than is the case in France, where the French president 
finds this comparatively easy. Other domestic constraints relate, especially in the 
UK, to the small size of available armed forces due to commitments elsewhere. 
The rise to prominence of DfID, which has no equivalent in France, is another 
factor of which the British government has to take account in decisions about 
security cooperation in Africa. While DfID potentially offers new opportunities 
through the creation of the Africa CPP, this is not primarily intended for ‘hard’ 
operations of the type that France is particularly well placed to undertake thanks 
to its pre-positioned forces in Africa.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how Britain and France have, since Saint-Malo, 
built new institutional bridges and cooperated more freely in ESDP missions and 
the training of African peacekeepers. It has also shown that there have been clear 
limits to this collaboration between Europe’s leading military powers and that 
cooperation has often been a function of individual personalities. Clearly, the P3 
initiative has enabled Britain and France to cooperate more at the level of the 
UNSC. The creation of the PSC has facilitated cooperation in Europe, as has the 
fact that the UK and France, as well as regularly holding the EU Presidency, have 
increasingly been called upon to chair European Council meetings in African 
capitals in which European member states and incoming Council Presidents, such 
as Slovenia and the Czech Republic, are not represented.
At the same time, there has been a convergence in understanding of the 
problems confronting Africa and of the link between security and development. 
Against the background of globalisation, the emergence of major new actors 
in Africa and the heightened perception of the economic and strategic threats 
posed by the African continent, Britain and France have felt the need to align 
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their agendas, either bilaterally, as has happened to a limited extent in the 
DRC, or bi-multilaterally, as was the case with the development of the Africa-
EU strategy in advance of the Lisbon summit (Elowson 2009: 27). However, 
there remains a strong sense of ‘division of labour’ between France operating in 
Francophone Africa and Britain in Anglophone Africa. Cooperation has taken 
place on particular issues, thanks to a shared understanding of challenges and a 
shared interest in addressing them, or an acknowledgment of the ‘comparative 
advantage’ of the other country. But it has not been systematic. Nor has it been 
accompanied by the degree of institutionalisation that might be implied by the 
term ‘partnership’. 
The signs are that cooperation will continue to be patchy for the foreseeable 
future. There is, for example, evidence to suggest that the French are increasingly 
interested in developing a stronger security relationship with the US in Africa, 
notably in the Sahel.8 On the British side, following the election of a Conservative-
led coalition government in 2010, the UK may well play a much less constructive 
role in future ESDP missions. Furthermore, almost any future British administration 
is likely to consider with trepidation the idea, propounded by France, that such 
missions, given their sheer number and complexity, require the establishment 
of a separate European HQ operating autonomously from NATO. At the same 
time, however, future governments in both countries will be under pressure to 
make savings, which may push them towards increased burden-sharing in certain 
situations. Moreover, the creation of the European External Action Service, post-
Lisbon, will increase pressure for policy coordination, not least in the security 
field where the two countries clearly have shared interests. 
8 Hitherto, this relationship seems to have been an exclusive one, although in 2009 
the UK government announced its intention to re-open an embassy in Mali in response 
to the execution of a British national and the wider threat of terrorism, migration and 
organised crime.
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